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On 19 June 2018, at a joint press conference with German chancellor Angela 
Merkel, French president Emmanuel Macron proclaimed that Europe, the EU and 
each of its member states had reached a moment of existential truth: unite or 
implode.  
 
Europe probably is facing exceptional challenges, but political leaders routinely 
deploy the language of crisis to make their points. Crisis and drama sell in a 
political age of rapid-fire social media and emotional exchange, and the visuals of 
politics – particularly of summitry – raise expectations of momentous change.  
The meaning of Macron (I) 
 
For his part, President Macron’s position is specifically designed to accommodate 
personal power, and he has shown every intention of deploying this arsenal to the 
full.  
 
A combination of good luck, timing and tactics won him the 2017 French 
presidency in an unprecedented manner, lending him an air of exceptionality. In 
power he is an iconoclast, ducking those who seek to pigeonhole him using 
customary labels of left, right, liberal, or other.  
 
In the 2017 contest, Macron fought off the notorious populist, radical right 
politician Marine le Pen with his own brand of positive populism. Campaigning 
from the grassroots up, he side-stepped and wrong-footed traditional political 
parties. He picked policy issues that trend – gender equality, energy transition, 
artificial intelligence. Nothing is off his radar; nothing, it appears, is sacrosanct, 
although he is no outsider, nor stranger to French political culture.  
 
It is hard enough to capture political leadership using the standard tools of 
academic analysis in normal times, let alone when a Macron (or a Trump) brings 
something novel to the spreadsheet. The human factor simply defies scientific 
rigour, however hard political scientists try to classify and categorise individual 
traits.  
 
We shy away from the ‘great man’ theory of leadership, for obvious reasons, and 
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‘heroic’ leadership is rarely attainable in democratic systems where leaders are 
contained, and deliberately so, by institutional checks and balances. Any sensible 
approach to understanding leadership must avoid claims to read leaders’ minds, 
and set the personal against the institutional (the political system), the 
conjuctural (the immediate context and its challenges), and the structural (the 
wider environment). 
 
However hard the task and however imperfect the results, analysing political 
leadership matters, if only to offer up something to temper popular expectations 
of individual leaders that are unrealistically high, and opinions that are 
correspondingly and predictably low when fast results fail to materialise 
(president Macron’s ratings, by the way, dipped sharply in the summer of 2018).  
The idea of disruption 
One notion that has found its way into daily conversations about politics in 
general and leaders in particular is that of disruption. Pascal Perrineau, veteran 
analyst of French party politics, entitled his edited volume on the 2017 French 
elections, no less, Le vote disruptif – the vote of disruption.  
 
Earlier the same year, I compared and contrasted Macron’s election as French 
president with the UK’s 2016 vote by referendum to leave the EU as moments of 
political disruption. The comparison was inspired by a BBC Radio 4 trio of short 
conversations with disruptor and disruptee (those disrupted) alike in three of the 
UK’s infamously hidebound markets: property, banking and death. In each case 
(getting a mortgage and buying a property; opening and managing a bank 
account; planning a funeral, respectively) , the disruptor emphatically rejected 
business as usual. In each case, the disrupted (the mortgage brokers, the estate 
agents, the high-street banks, the funeral directors) had a choice of how to 
respond to the challenger. Sometimes, business turns out to be usual for a 
reason, and disruption could harm the customer; sometimes not, and 
technological innovation can only improve matters.  
 
Disruption theory comes to us from the academic literatures of business 
management and merits a closer look if we are to use it to get a handle on 
political leadership. The theory distinguishes market incumbents from new 
entrants. Incumbents’ ability to correctly diagnose genuinely disruptive 
innovation is crucial to their survival: there are win-win scenarios, when markets 
expand. There are also unseemly crashes. New entrants’ chances of truly up-
ending the status quo reside in the novelty of their business model: disruption is 
primarily process, not merely product (or service). Disruption has come to 
connote success in the business world, but it can just as equally fail: high risk is 
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built into the very nature of disruption. Successful disruptors target the 
‘overlooked’: the customers who the incumbents have, for one reason or other, 
neglected.  
The meaning of Macron (II) 
 
President Macron has not just divided attention: he has provoked remarkably 
bilious criticism that on occasions can come across as hatred or prejudice. Bile 
currently runs close to the surface in politics, and not just in France: we are living 
in sensitive times and the stakes, domestic and geopolitical alike, are 
uncomfortably high.  
 
Emmanuel Macron’s election manifesto promised a Révolution. Perhaps the 
incumbents of French politics should have taken him at his word. He was a new 
entrant in the literal sense, forming his Obama-like political movement En 
Marche! only a year before the 2017 campaign, and to the surprise of the 
incumbent parties. He notably outplayed the other would-be disruptors of the 
French political scene, Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Marine le Pen, in both cases 
partly by luck. France’s traditional, incumbent parties lay in tatters once the 
political typhoon of 2017 was spent, their resilience now depending on a correct 
diagnosis of the nature of the threat of this new entrant.  
 
If Macron is to be a successful disruptor of French politics, then his constitutional 
reform will have to stick, his party La République en Marche (LREM) will have to 
cohere, his policies will need to bear fruit, and the ‘overlooked’ will need to 
consider themselves better served by the new kid, and commit their support.  
 
Even where the levers are accessible to president Macron, the signs are not good, 
and own goals have already been scored in this first half of the 2017-2021 
presidency. The parliamentary discussion of the constitutional reform bill was 
postponed while the French presidency scrambled to contain the Benalla affair. 
That scandal raised ethical questions about the conduct of the presidential inner 
circle, damaging Macron’s self-image as a president with integrity.  
 
LREM is showing its cracks, including over the content of the proposed 
constitutional reform itself. Macron’s government has seen resignations and 
departures, and a reshuffle is imminent at the time of writing. Macron has been 
explicit that policy reform is a slow burn process, and that his eyes are fixed on a 
10-year horizon, but today’s politics demands the instant fix, and his mandate is a 
short five years.  
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Macron has succeeded in passing certain labour law reforms but is struggling to 
shake off an image as elitist and friend of the rich. Those who felt overlooked by 
the system and who turned their backs on the established parties are not all 
Macron fans: far from it. He barely squeaked into the second round of the 
presidential election ahead of Mélenchon and le Pen, and his voters in the second 
round run-off are a disparate collection from across the generations and social 
classes, not a stable electoral base. 
 
Not only incumbents but also disruptors can misread the ‘market’ – the political 
climate. Perhaps Macron is ahead of his time, or perhaps he is a fake disruptor in 
the first place, a one-man machine for the sort of hypermasculine occupation and 
projection of political power that is all too familiar to us. And perhaps the theory 
of disruption has no place in politics. Voters are not consumers, nations are not 
markets, and political parties are not businesses. Politics is a human endeavour at 
heart, and political leaders are flawed humans. These flawed humans must, in 
today’s democracies at least, operate alongside substantial organisational inertia.  
 
A rival theory from the business world argues that successful disruption 
requires ‘architectural innovation’ – the remaking of the organisation itself. 
Contemporary France – the ‘organisation’ in question here - is a country with a 
very strong narrative of self, making the stakes of disruption particularly high. 
Perhaps an early lesson from the case of Macron is that in politics, disruption will 
fail, absent a Révolution.  
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